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The following discussion is concerned with certain forms of poor practice in academic 
publishing that give rise to “academic urban legends”. It suggests that rather than simply 
consider phenomena such as poor citation practices and circular reporting as mistakes, 
misunderstandings, and evidence of lack of rigour, we might also read them as evidence of a 
particular kind of creativity – for which misunderstandings, assumptions and failures of diligence 
are mechanisms by which potentially influential ideas manifest. Reflecting particularly on a 
critique of the debate around on pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement and its use by university 
staff and students, the following will argue that investigators within these disciplines are 
themselves implicated as potential subjects. Alongside reflections from science fiction studies 
that offers insights into the experiential dimension of reading and misreading, this paper offers 
some insights regarding how we might think of mistakes and misunderstandings as a form of 






Academic urban legends 
In his paper Academic Urban Legends, Ole Bjørn Rekdal (2014a) reconstructed the birth of 
the widely held but misplaced belief that ‘spinach is an excellent source of iron’ (p.639). 
Ironically, through the poor citation practices of those who commented on it, the story about 
spinach, often used as an example of academic carelessness, became attached to another 
academic urban legend, which blamed the mistake regarding spinach’s dietary attributes on the 
misprinting of a measurement of iron content with a misplaced decimal point. Tracing back 
through the nested citations that gave rise to this second story Rekdal (2014a) showed that it too, 
is ungrounded. Many of the authors who mistakenly used the example of spinach in this way 
never went back to consult the original source, with the result that a claim that was itself 
unsubstantiated, was also consistently reported inaccurately. A damning pattern of citation errors 
in work that was intended to debunk myths in science and medicine but instead perpetuated them 
was the result.  
Citation plagiarism - in which a secondary citation is presented as a primary one without 
consulting the original source, was the main culprit in Rekdal’s analysis (2014, p.639) As he 
pointed out, for academic writers who want to reuse an idea or phrasing, the temptation is to 
make use of references reported in other texts in this way. If the preceeding author has reported 
the content of the source with honesty and accuracy, this kind of omission is undetectable. 
Unreliable sources, and citation that misrepresents and solidifies tentative or faulty evidence 
however, contribute to the generation of academic urban legends. 
Despite the moral and practical implications of having the wrong facts before us, in the case 
of academic writing the selection of evidence to build an argument is also engaged with the 
considerations of how to get an argument where it is going. Whether careless, lazy, or outright 
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dishonest, the examples that Rekdal examined in his work are troubling; both given the effects of 
a misapprehension with the scale and influence of the myth about spinach, and how apparently 
endemic this type of inaccuracy appears to be (Rekdal, 2014a; 2014b). However, as the 
following discussion will suggest, apart from as failure, the academic urban legend can also be 
read in another way - as evidence of a particular kind of creativity – for which 
misunderstandings, assumptions and failures of diligence are mechanisms by which potentially 
influential ideas manifest. 
 
The self-referential debate about neuro-enhancement technologies 
 Debates about neuro-enhancement technologies are another discourse that garnered 
criticism. An example is Hazem Zhony’s (2015) analysis of the discussion of ‘pharmaceutical 
cognitive enhancement’ (PCE), PCE is the off-prescription use of drugs such as Adderall and 
Ritalin for performance enhancement that has been allegedly on the rise in workplaces, schools 
and universities (the discussion centres around the United States). Zhony argued that while 
recently the subject of intense discussion, the nature, novelty, and prevalence of PCE has been 
consistently overstated. In addition to a number of conceptual problems, technologies indicated 
by the novel terms “cogntive- and neuro-enhancement” (p. 264) are neither conceptually or 
technologically new; 1 and the concept of neuroenhancement itself is a misnomer. Zhony argued 
that there is good evidence that drugs associated with cognitive enhancement only generate 
experiences of enhanced cognitive function - improving mood and feeling, but not actual 
                                                
1 Adderall for example, is a mixture of amphetamines. Although at this juncture Tom Wolfe would 
probably point out that the widespread practices of prescribing amphetamines to children may be new, 
despite the fact that he first came across their use in the 1960 (Wolfe, 1997). For a history of the 
relationship of drug to network technologies see (Power, 2013). 
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performance. Cognition – when separated from mood and attention – is a problematic category 
(p.263-4).  
Similar with Rekdal’s discussion of citation plagiarism, Zhony pointed out that the discourse 
around PCE shows evidence of “circular reporting, whereby the media references academic 
papers and academic papers reference the media” (p. 265). In this back and forth between the 
academic literature and the media – which regularly reports on PCE and other forms of cognitive 
enhancement such as ‘nootropics’, the to interrogate the quality of citations has led to the 
perception that PCE is effective and widespread in use.  
While PCE may be partly fiction, the debate around it remains productive in a number of 
ways. For commentators, particularly in disciplines such as neuroethics, the growth of the PCE 
legend has offered an argument for discussions about the politics of enhancement legality and 
decriminalisation, workplace pressure, education, and neoliberalism (Wiegel et. al, 2016; 
Sampson, 2016). The dialogue, for better or worse, is one that moves between academic 
disciplines, and the popular press where commentators attempt to open, and perhaps feed the 
debate. Petrounin’s (2014) article “European Students’ Use of ‘Smart Drugs’ Is Said to Rise” in 
the New York Times, cites an interview with an academic who despite having ‘no longitudinal 
data’, has the ‘impression from discussions with students over the last years that consumption 
has likely increased’ (Savulescu, 2015). The exciting and troubling prospect of widespread PNE 
becomes a hook, or perhaps a wedge, a way to accesses and evidences other, more occult and 
harder to articulate problems around self-determination, emerging technology, and the nature of 
knowledge-work. Another feature of this debate is the way in which the regularity with which 
PCE and similar technologies are mentioned popularizes and spreads the idea that they are 
necessary and acceptable. Inaccurate and overblown it may be, but the idea of neuro-
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enhancement is an idea with substantial weight, and as a technological imaginary (Punt, 2000) 
encapsulates a popular model for a technology that holds sufficient weight to pick up its own 
momentum.2 
 
Cognitive innovation, looping effects, and bootstrapping. 
Central to the integrative definition of ‘cognitive innovation’ proposed by CogNovo PIs was 
been the idea that it is a process by which an individual, or a society, engages in ‘constructing 
and adapting the self’ (Gummerum and Denham, 2014, p. 586). Taking this as a model of 
cognitive ‘bootstrapping’ they refer to a recursive ‘creativity function’, the results of which are 
creative products that may be seen as the results of individual self-adjustment and self-reflexive 
perception (Denham & Punt, 2017, p. 1). With its focus on recursive processes, this definition of 
cognitive innovation can be seen to refer to the cybernetic potential of the mind at work on itself, 
both at a neural and – through representation – cultural level. 
 While individual cognitive innovation is self-reflexive, if not self-aware, on a cultural 
level it might be argued that the cognitive sciences and discourses that surround them are a 
source of novel ideas about the mind and self that might be incorporated into working models of 
exploration. The idea that the language, models, and discourses of the human sciences influence 
the way in which people understand themselves is a mainstay of academic work that seeks to 
them from historical and cultural perspectives. Projects of categorization, diagnostic and 
managerial in the human and social sciences influence how people think about themselves and 
one other, with the curious effect that they become ‘looping kinds’ (Hacking, 1995, p. 352-355).  
                                                
2  Atkinson’s. Delete: a Design History of Computer Vapourware, 2013, offers complimentary examples of how the 
computing industry has produced ‘vapourware’ products that are in some cases never intended to reach 




 Michael Pettit has pointed out that “few have greater confidence in psychology’s ability 
to mold subjectivity than its critics” (2015, p.146): the principle of looping kinds is so rarely 
questioned that it has become a truism. He argues that current work to historicize psychology 
tends all too easily to anticipate a one-directional flow of influence between the sciences and the 
subject. He makes a number of suggestions about what is missing from accounts of ‘the loop’. 
Building on an awareness that “subjectivity is neither something authentic and interior that 
psychology documents nor is it something imposed from outside” (p. 155), approaches might 
incorporate models of cognition and affect; or models of culture. These recognize the agency of 
audiences and their role in interpreting and making use of the way in which they are represented; 
“the social life of psychological science is simultaneously a set of stories about the subject’s 
augmentation, exploitation, cooptation, appropriation, defiance, incredulity, and boredom”(p. 
155). 
 Pettit’s critique, and his suggestion that we might be more “attentive to […] the 
materiality of the circuits through which psychology travels” (p. 155) also suggests something 
might be gained from further exchange between critical history of psychology and media 
historical or media archaeological work that considers people not as subjects, but as audiences. 
While some of this work takes its objects of study to be the development of specific media 
forms, for the most part accounts of cognition and affect, and the audience as actively engaged in 
the interpretation, reception and development of media forms and content, are fundamental 
concerns; media, such as the academic texts and media reports discussed above, are material and 
cultural expressions of creativity (Punt, 2000; Pepperell and Punt, 2003). In The View from the 
Bridge, Denham and Punt (2017),  elucidate this position with regards to the development of the 
cinema as a cognitive apparatus. They draw on Gustav Metz to argue that the cinema is a “is a 
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technological experience in which the viewer engages with their perception in action” (p. 2)3. We 
might imagine that in the case of media which represents ideas from the psychological or 
cognitive sciences, that this self-reflexivity may become even more pronounced. Indeed, Marcia 
Holmes, in a paper exploring the representation of brain-washing technologies in cinema, argues 
that these narratives, delivered by a cinematic apparatus comparable to the represented 
technology in the film produce a particular, and very active subject position, that of the 
“cybernetic spectator” – “a subject who scrutinises how media and other demands on her sensory 
perception can affect consciousness, and seeks to consciously participate in the mental 
conditioning and guide its effects” (Holmes, 2017, p. 3).  
Bearing in mind this self-referential attention to the meaning and content of experience, 
within a narrative that stresses the plasticity and potential manipulability of the subject, we might 
reflect on the fact that in certain cases, as researchers, academics and educators, the subjects of 
the PCE discussion are broadly same community who investigate it. As Holmes invocation of 
cybernetics stresses, much as the invocation of ‘bootstrapping’ (Punt and Denham, 2016, p. 184), 
the looping effects are in themselves generative, and hence academic mistakes and 
misunderstandings, we might speculate that they are evidence of cultural level cognitive 
innovation. In this, the media offers an expression as well as ‘scaffolding’ (Clark, 2015, p. 18) 
for cognitive innovation as much as cultural creativity.  
 
Academic writing as sf – and using sf to discuss it. 
Since the late 80s and 90s the invention of novel terms signifying new technological and 
conceptual developments have offered a currency of bi-directional exchange between techno-
                                                
3 Here we see Metz’s idea doubly out of context and secondarily cited. 
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scientific research, culture and science fiction (sf). there is a lot to be recommended here – 
Ronay’s earlier work on Haraway As Istivan Csicsery-Ronay (2008). 
 Csicsery-Ronay’s in depth analysis of the nature and affordances of ‘fictive neology’(p.13-
46) is instructive as to how we might begin thinking about the creative and aesthetic aspects of 
discourses that have cultural intersections with sf, Neologisms are generated in a variety of ways 
that include shifts in meaning, lengthening, shortening, and compounding terms. points out, it is 
only when certain aspects of scientific knowledge become accessible to the public through 
journalism and science communication initiatives, that they are ubiquitous enough to be 
incorporated into writing practices, as academic, journalistic, and fictional discourses 
intermingle. The practice of ‘neologogenesis’, the creation of new terms, is one that 
communicates the ‘linguistic power’(p. 14) of the new word’s users. 
In sf, the very existence of new words in the fictional world prompt the reader to consider the 
events and conditions that have made them necessary. As Csiscery-Ronay suggests, drawing on 
Samuel Delaney’s work, in a text where many, if not all of the words are familiar, we assume 
that the world described in the text is identical to the one we already know (p.22). When a 
neologism appears in the text, we must account for what is different about that world that has led 
to the word coming into existence, and indeed use. The loglo of Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash 
(1992: 7) – the unbroken lights of fast food franchises, motels and nation states that line the 
freeways of U.S West coast – indicates a specific feature of the landscape so ubiquitous it 
requires its own term.but within the account he offers is a discussion of the kind of experience 
that engagement with novel terminology evokes, that points this discussion towards a 
consideration of how the academic texts discussed above dealt with. The way they function for 
the readers, writers and thinkers who make use of them; and how neologisms create a certain 
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type of reading experience.  
When do readers do this work of interpreting? While novel words prompt imaginative 
invention, but they might also be dealt with by being ignored, or at least overlooked. A feature of 
perceptual creativity and bootstrapping, may be a development of the ability to overlook or 
ignore one’s lack of understanding or familiarity with a term. Rekdal’s (2014) reminder that 
striving to use primary sources is a ‘basic academic principle’ (p.744) is correct, but still, 
secondary citation, offers a space for ‘boostrapping’. Likewise the ‘feverish linguistic 
atmosphere’ (Csicsery-Ronay, p. 26) of genres such as cyberpunk fiction might offer cognitive 
training grounds for dealing with unresolvable levels of novelty and ambiguity, whether for the 
apparent dislocations of contemporary techno-culture, or perhaps working in a transdisciplinary 
research environments where ambiguity is often criticized, but may have its own benefits. 
Despite the conflicting variety of reasons that individuals are interested in the discussion of 
PCE, the ways in which the discussion has been generated, enabled and distorted, can be seen as 
a productive cultural function of the mind’s interest in itself, the potential misunderstandings 
about PCE that it entails don’t mean that it is necessary to undermine the productivity of the 
discourse, if we consider how they reflect potentials rather than facts.4 Circular reporting and 
academic urban legends fit alongside the creative shifting of neologism. As different features of 
writing practices, they offer ways for the bootstrapping processes of self-adjustment to take place 
within and at the fringes of research spaces. They suggest that people, including scientists – on 
individual and social levels – may be thought of as ‘cybernetic investigators’, whose failings 
                                                
4 This observation would also be supported by the similar discussions around direct current stimulation 
(DCS) technologies, which involve the application of electrical current to the head or brain, equally for 
therapeutic purposes/neuroscientific experimentation and (apparently) increasingly used for performance 
enhancement (Wexler, 2016). 
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may sometimes have their own value.  
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